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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the impact of various configurations of regional economic integration 
on member countries as well as on outside countries under realistic assumptions. That is, we 
consider constant externaltariffs·11s required-byArticleXXIV-ofthe GATT and the asymmetric 
formation of the FfA where some countries form a FfA while others are left behind. Extending 
the Krugman framework for the analysis of regional integration, we decompose the impact of 
regional integration into a few subeffects, each of which has a clear economic implication. 
Further, we show that economic integration definitely worsens the welfare of the countries that 
are left behind even if the external tariffs of the FfA remain unraised. 
Finally, we calibrate the model to obtain insights into motivations for countries to form 
regional integration. The simulation results clarify the incentive structure of major participants, 
e.g., the United States, Japan, and smaller Asian countries, who face various configurations of 
regional integration, such as EU, NAFfA, "EAEC", and APEC. The simulation suggests that the 
APEC may be a politically feasible configuration in the world because it substantially increases 
the welfare level of major participants. Moreover, world-wide free trade may be difficult to 
achieve, because completely free trade implies a reduction of the welfare level of the major 
players from the levels that are achieved under various configurations of the FfA. 
JEL Code: F15 




The present world is an experimental ground for economic integration. Europe is 
attempting to achieve integration of trade, factor movements, and money. In the field of 
trade and investment alone, the European Union (EU) is followed by the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFfA). Asian countries were looking forward to 
forming a union like the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), but the United States is 
now embracing all the Pacific rim countries into the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Conference (APEC). One cannot exaggerate the need for an analytical framework to 
assess the benefit-cost of joining in an economic integration because the decision to join 
or not to join should depend on the benefit and cost of the participation of a country. 
Krugman (1991) developed an elegant model of optimal tariffs and regional 
integration based on the theoretical work of Gros (1987). Krugman considered the 
process of economic integration by proceeding from the collection of independent 
individual nations to the divided world where the same number of nations form a 
symmetric economic union. Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1994) generalized Krugman's 
model by relying on simulations. 
This paper addresses similar issues, but deviates from their approach in the 
following three important aspects. First, we do not analyze the situation in which 
nations adopt, as in a Nash equilibrium fashion, optimal tariffs. For economists who are 
accustomed to optimization, the analysis of the interaction of optimal tariffs may seem a 
natural theoretical setup. However, it is not a realistic set up. Note that Article XXIV 
of the GAIT stipulates: 
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" ..... the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of any such 
union or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties not parties to 
such union or agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the 
general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent 
territories prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such interim 
agreement, ..... " 
Thus the adoption of optimal tariffs is precluded de jure. Moreover, seldom does one, 
or we should say never, observe circumstances under which countries that join an 
economic union happen to raise their external tariff rates to the rest of the world. Thus 
the assumption of optimal tariffs is unrealistic de facto. Accordingly, we study the world 
in which tariff rates are constant. This makes the analysis more realistic as well as less 
complicated. The simplicity we obtain by the assumption of constant tariff enables us to 
address more realistic questions. 
Second, even though we also rely on simulation methods, we pursue analytical 
solutions to the problem as far as possible. It is where the analytical method extends to 
the extreme that we resort to the simulation of the calibrated model. By analytical 
method, we can decompose the impact of regional integration into a few components 
and interprete each component by economic reasoning. By this effort, the interpretation 
of the simulation results can become more transparent and more instructive. 
Third, and most importantly, Krugman's framework is limited to symmetric cases, 
i.e., cases in which each union has the same number of countries. Although this 
assumption allows the situation to be simplified, it gives the model limited implications 
for the world economy, where country sizes vary and economic unions contain different 
number of countries. Moreover, a symmetric framework, one cannot analyze the welfare 
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of those left behind.2 Thus, in this paper we analyze the effect of asymmetric unions. 
By doing so, we are able to calculate the benefits and costs of forming a new regional 
union for the countries in the world. In the last section's simulation, the benefits and 
costs of the EU countries, the NAFfA countries and the Asian countries are explicitly 
calculated. This could not be done under the symmetry assumption. 
In short, this paper will analyze the impact of various configurations of regional 
economic integration on member countries as well as on outside countries under the 
realistic assumptions of constant external tariffs and asymmetric formation of the free 
trade area (FfA). In the next section, a general model of regional economic integration, 
which incorporates various realities, including product differentiation and increasing 
returns to scale, will be developed. Its basic production structure will be analyzed. 
In Section III, the model is applied to the analysis of asymmetric regional 
integration, where only some of the countries form an FfA while others are left out of 
any FfA. We can decompose the impact of regional integration on the third country as 
well as on a member country into several components, each of which has distinct 
economic implications. Further, we will show that when the FfA is created or enlarged, 
the terms of trade for outside countries always worsen, and that even if the external tariffs 
of the FTA remain the same, as Article XXIV of the GATT requires, the welfare of the third 
country, which is left out of the FTA, unambiguously declines. Moreover, while the impact 
of the regional integration on the member's welfare cannot be determined analytically, 
Goto and Hamada (1994) analyzes the welfare of those who are left behind by 
using a four-country model. 
3 
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simulation results suggest that the welfare level of the member increases at first with the 
expansion of an FTA. However, when the size of the FTA becomes large, the member's 
welfare begins to be decreased by the further expansion of the FTA. This constitutes a 
disincentive for admitting new members. 
In Section IV, the model is calibrated to obtain the likely welfare impact of 
various scenarios of regional integration in the real world, e.g., EU, NAFTA, EAEC, and 
APEC. For each configuration of regional economic integration, the welfare level of 
major players will be calculated and compared with that in alternative configuration. 
The simulation results show the following: When EU and NAFTA are formed, smaller 
Asian countries incur substantial welfare loss; When Asian countries including Japan 
form a counter bloc such as the EAEC, the welfare level of the United States declines to 
the level lower than the pre-NAFTA situation; When all countries in Asia and Pacific are 
united into the APEC, not only small Asian countries but also large countries like the 
U.S. and Japan would substantially benefit from it; When the complete free trade of the 
world realizes, the welfare levels of the major countries substantially decline from those 
being achieved in various configurations of the FTA, although the welfare of the rest of 
the world who had been left behind from any FTA before is dramatically improved by 
the worldwide free trade. 
Section V concludes the paper and presents some agenda for further researches 
on the subject. 
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II. The General Model 
1. Specification of the General Model 
In this section we present a general model for the analysis of regional economic 
integration that incorporates various realities including product differentiation, increasing 
returns to scale, differences in country size, etc. In the later sections we add further 
simplifying assumptions to keep the analysis compact. 
In the general model, the situation of a representative country k (k= 1,2,3, ..... .M) is 
as follows. Consumers possess the individualistic social utility function (Uk) 
N .!_
(1) Uk = [~C!] 13 , 0</3<1, 
i4 
where Cik is the amount of consumption of the i-th differentiated product in country k, 
and N is the number of types of differentiated products available to consumers. Some of 
the differentiated products are domestically produced while others are imported from 
foreign countries. Consumers maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint 
N 
(2) 
~pikCik = y k ' 
i=l 
where Pik is the domestic price (i.e., tariff-inclusive price) of the i-th differentiated 
product in country k, and Yk is the national income of country k. 








Zk = ~Cik • 
i=l 
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From (3) the elasticity of demand for the i-th differentiated product ( Eik) is 
1(5) 
{3cf3 
(1- /3) + _!!: 
Zk 
If we assume the symmetry of each differentiated product and a large number of N, as 
Krugman (1979) and Dixit and Norman (1980) did, (5) reduces to the following by 
neglecting the second term of the denominator of the right-hand-side. 
1(5)' E = --
k l-{3 . 
In equation (5)' we omit the subscript i for E because the demand elasticity turns out to 
be the same for all products due to the assumptions of symmetry and the large number 
of N. These assumptions would simplify the analysis to a greater extent. 
The producer of the i-th differentiated product in country k is characterized by 
the cost function 
M 
(6) TCik = WkF + Wkm(I: Cg) , 
j=1 
where TCik and Wk are total cost of the i-th producer and wage rate in country k, 
respectively, and mis the labor input requirement per unit of output, while Fis a fixed 
amount of factor input necessary for any positive amount of production. Due to the 
fixed cost WJ!', the production technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. The 
producer maximizes the profit function 
(7) 'TT'ik 
where 1ri is the profit of the i-th producer and tij is the tariff rate imposed by country j on 
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the i-th differentiated product. When country j is the home country, a tariff rate is zero 
(i.e., tik =0). From the profit maximization problem, we obtain the profit maximizing 
price for the i-th producer in country k as 
(8) P .. 
I] 
Further, we assume free entry and free exit. Therefore, the profit of each existing firm is 
forced to zero in equilibrium. Hence, in equilibrium, we have 
The demand for labor input by the i-th producer (l;) is obtained as 
M 
(l0) l. = F + m I: C.. . 
I I)
j=l 
The domestic labor supply is assumed to be constant, i.e., there are no wage-
leisure tradeoffs. Therefore, the sum of labor input in all firms in country k is equal to 
the amount of the domestic labor supply in that country (Lk)· 
(11) 
where Nk is the number of firms in country k. 
The tariff revenue accrued to the government is assumed to be distributed to 
domestic consumers in a lump-sum fashion. Since there is no profit in equilibrium, the 
national income consists of factor payments and tariff revenues. 
(12) 
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The above model is complete, and the above specification gives equilibrium 
conditions for a representative country k. We can solve the model which consists of M 
countries, once the values of the parameters (m, F, /3, tih Lh M, and N) are identified. 
Note that this general model can accommodate any number of countries (M) and 
commodities (N) as well as the differences in country sizes Lk. 
2. Implications of the Assumption of Constant Elasticity 
Here we present a variant of the Krugman model in which all products are 
differentiated, although in Sections III and IV we use a simpler version of the product 
differentiation model, based on Armington (1969), in which products produced in the 
same location are assumed to be perfect substitutes, and products produced in different 
locations are differentiated. 
We use the Krugman model for the following reasons. First, the effect of 
economic integration under constant returns to scale, such as in the Heckscher-Ohlin­
Samuelson (HOS) model, has been extensively studied since Viner (1950), though its 
impact on the rest of the world has been relatively neglected. Moreover, it seems, in the 
real world, that the role of increasing returns to scale is extremely important, and that 
the new trade theory, with increasing returns and monopolistic competition, seems to 
grasp the reality of trade in manufactured goods fairly well. 
As mentioned above, we assume the number of the firms to be large enough to 
justify the constant elasticity of the demand function. Because of this assumption, even 
though the decreasing cost plays an important role in determining the equilibrium, the 
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resulting scale of production and the equilibrium average cost are not changed by the 
existence of trade. Suppose that the utility function and the production function of the i­
th producer are characterized, respectively, by 
N .!_
(13) 
Uk = [:E G] 13 ' 0 < /3 < 1 
i=l 
and 
(14) xi = f (l;) 
Then, the amount of factor input (( ) and the amount of output (x; ) is completely 
determined by the following conditions (see Gros (1987) for a proof): 
df (l;) I; 1(15) •--
d li f (l;) /3 
The left-hand-side of equation (15) can be interpreted as the degree of economy of scale 
in production, while the right-hand-side can be interpreted as the degree ofproduct 
differentiation from the consumers' viewpoint. 
Applying this relationship to the model developed in subsection 11.1, we know that 
the amount of production of the i-th firm (x; ) and the number of firms in country k 
(Nk) are invariant and expressed as follows: 
F/3(16) x. = ----'--
I m (l -/3) 
and 
(17) Nk = l - /3 Lk . 
F 
Therefore, the total amount of production of differentiated products in country k 
becomes the following. 
(18) 
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Therefore, by the choice of units, the total amount of production in country k (and that 
of every country under symmetry) can be normalized as unity. Thus, the specification in 
Section III and Section IV below, where each country is assumed to produce one unit of 
the differentiated product, is essentially equivalent to the general specification above under 
the assumption of constant elasticity. However, even if the production sides are not 
affected, the country's welfare is affected by the regional economic integration through 
the change in the demand side; that is, through the effect that consumers can consume 
more balanced bundles of goods under freer trade. This will be discussed in detail in the 
following sections. 
III. The Effects of Asymmetric Integration 
In this section we examine the impact of progress toward regional integration on 
the welfare of each country in the world. Although our analysis extends Krugman's 
analysis, it differs distinctively from his in the three respects, as discussed previously: (i) 
we assume co,zstant tariffs rather than optimal tariffs; (ii) we carry our theoretical analysis 
to the boundary where simulation is absolutely necessary; and (iii) we examine the effect 
of asymmetric regi,onal integration where only some of the countries form a FfA while 
others are left out of any FfA. 
1. The Model 
The basic assumptions in this section are similar to those in Section II above. 
The only difference here is that the world consists of a large number of N identical 
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provinces, of which n provinces form a FTA while the other (N-n) provinces are left out. 
Trades within the FfA are subject to no tariffs, while other trades are subject to a 
constant tariff t. Each province specializes in the production of a type of differentiated 
products. Since all provinces are assumed to be identical, without loss of generality, each 
province is assumed to produce one unit of a type of differentiated products. 
In what follows, we utilize the indirect utility function to simplify the algebra. In 
the model here, consumers in the representative province (or country) in the FTA are 
characterized by the indirect utility function 
(19) N 
Vp(P, YJ = [~P;rl/r YF 
i=l 
where r =_/}_ 0 < /3 < 1 , 
- /3-1' 
where Vp and YF are the utility and income of the representative country in the FfA. 
P;p is the consumer price of a good produced in country i which is consumed in the 
representative country in the FTA. Since the producer price of the rest of the world 
(ROW) good is set to unity, and since the producer price of the FTA good is P, the 
consumer prices of the FfA good and the ROW good in the representative country of 
the FTA are, respectively, P and (1+t). Further, there are n countries in the FfA and 
(N-n) countries in the ROW. Therefore, the indirect utility function of the 
representative province in the FTA can be expressed as 
Further, since income consists of the value of own output and tariff revenues, we have 
11 
(21) YF = nPCFF + (N-n)(l+t)CRF = P+t(N-n)CRF . 
Here CFF and CRF are, respectively, the amounts of consumption of each type of FfA 
good and ROW good in the representative province in the FfA. 
Applying Roy'.s identity, we obtain the demand functions as 
pr-1
(22) CFF = -------- YF ' 
nP' + (N-n) (l+ty 
and 
(23) 
Similarly, the indirect utility function of consumers of the representative province 
in the rest of the world is expressed by 
The income of the representative province in the ROW is expressed by 
(25) 
YR = n(l +t)PCFR +(N-n-1)(1 +t)CJR +ChR 
= 1+ tnCFR + t (N - n - 1 )C JR , 
where CFR is the amount of consumption of each type of FfA good in the representative 
province in the FfA. CfR. is the imported amount of each type of ROW good, and ChR 
is the amount of the home good consumed in the representative province in the ROW. 
Applying Roy's identity, we obtain the demand functions as 
_ (1 + ty-lpr-1
(26) CFR - -----'-~'-------- YR , 
n(l+tYP' + (N-n-l)(l+ty + 1 
(1 + ty-1 
-----~~------YR ' 





n(l+tYP' + (N-n-l)(l+ty + 1 
The trade has to be balanced in equilibrium, i.e., 
By Walrus's law, one of the above eleven equations is redundant. So, ten 
independent equations determine ten endogenous variables (VF> VR> YF> YR> CFF> CAA CFR> 
Cffe ChR> and P). In what follows, we examine the impact of an increase inn (i.e., 
creation and/or expansion of an FfA3) on the welfare of ROW as well as FfA countries. 
2. The Effects on Relative Price (Terms of Trade) 
Before going into the welfare analysis of the FfA, let us examine, as a 
preliminary step, the impact of the increase in the number of countries in the FfA (n) 
on the relative price or terms of trade (P). After repeated substitution of variables in 
the above equilibrium conditions and rearrangement, we obtain the following implicit 
relationship between P and n: 
(30) nP+[(N-n-l)+(l+t)1Pa-n(l+ttP 1-a-N+n = 0 
1where a= -- .
1-/3
From equation (30), it is clear that, for a given n, the left-hand-side (LHS) of the 
equation is an increasing function of P (note that a is greater than one). Substituting 
P= 1 into the LHS, we obtain the following. 
3When n increases from one to two, we can regard this change as the creation of an 
FfA since two countries unite together. When n increases further, we can regard this 
change as an expansion of the FfA. 
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(31) LHS IP=l = (n -1)[1-(l+t)1 
Since both a and (1 +t) are greater than one, the LHS in equation (31) is equal to zero 
only if n is unity. Otheiwise the LHS in equation (31) is negative. Since the LHS in 
equation (30) is an increasing function of P for a given n, in order to satisfy equation 
(30), P must be greater than unity whenever n is greater than unity. In other words, we 
obtain 
(32) 1 < P if 1 < n . 
Thus, the following proposition is proved. 
(Proposition 1) The terms of trade of the member country of any size of the FTA is better 
than that of the nonmember. 
Then what is the impact of the creation and/or expansion of the FfA on the 
terms of trade or the value of g_P/gft. Rearranging equation (30), we obtain 
(33) n = _ (Pa-l)N+[(l+tt-l]Pa . 
p_ pa_ (1 + ttpl-a+1 
Since n is positive and the numerator of the right-hand-side (RHS) is positive, the 
denominator of the RHS of equation (33) must be negative. Applying the implicit 
function rule of differentiation to equation (30), we obtain the following: 
dP(34) 
dn 
Note that the denominator of the RHS.of equation (34) is positive and that the 
numerator is negative (see equation (33)). Therefore, the derivative of P with respect to 
n is positive. 
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(35) dP > 0 
dn 
Thus, the following proposition is proved. 
(Proposition 2) When an FTA 'is created or enlarged, the terms of trade of member 
countries against the rest of the world 'is always improving; in other words, the creation or 
expansion of the FTA always worsens the terms of trade of outside countries. 
Then, how far does P increase as the size of FfA expands? When n=N (i.e., free 
trade prevails all over the world), the terms of trade of any country return to one just as 
in the case of a totally fragmented world. Therefore, we consider the situation only up 
to n=N-1. From (35), Pis the largest when n=N-1, and the LHS of equation (30) is a 
monotonically increasing function of P for a given n. Substituting P=(l +t) and n=N-1, 
into the LHS of equation (30) and rearranging, we obtain 
(36) LHS IP=l+t = (l +t)2° -1 . 
Clearly, the LHS of (36), i.e., at P=(l+t) and n=N-1 is positive. Therefore, the 
maximum value of P (i.e., at n=N-1) must be smaller than (1 +t) if (30) is to hold with 
equality. From this, we obtain the following4: 
(37) p < (l + t) 
Note that the tariff-inclusive price of the ROW good and the price of the FfA good are, 
respectively, (1 +t) and P. Thus, the following proposition is proved. 
41n fact, we can show that, in the limit when N goes to infinity, the maximum value 
of Pis (1 +t). 
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(Proposition 3) In the FTA, the consumer price of an imported FTA good 'is always 
cheaper than that of a good imported from the ROW. 
From Proposition 3 and equations (22) and (23), the following proposition is obvious. 
(Proposition 4) In the representative country in the FTA the amount of consumption of a 
type ofFTA good 'is always larger than that of a type imported from the ROW. 
3. The Effect of on the Welfare of Outside Countries 
In the analysis based upon the optimal tariff,5 it is suggested that, as the FfA is 
created or expanded, the welfare of outside countries worsens because the market power 
of the expanded FfA becomes stronger than before so that it can impose a higher 
optimal tariff against outside countries. As mentioned above, such an increase in the 
external tariff is explicitly prohibited by Article XXIV of the GAIT and such an increase 
of external barriers after the creation or expansion of the FIA has been rarely observed 
in the real world. However, we can show below that even if Article XXIV of the GAIT 
is strictly enforced, the third country will be still worse off as the result of the creation or 
expansion of the outside FIA. 
As shown in equation (24), the welfare of the representative country in the rest of 
the world is expressed by the following indirect utility function: 
(24)' VR = AR YR 
See Yi (1995), for example. 
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where AR = [n(l + f{Pr + (N- n-1) (1 + f{ + 1r11r 
Equation (24)' implies that the change in the utility (VR) can be decomposed into the 
price effect (i.e., the change ink) and the income effect (the change in YR)· We will 
examine the two effects in tum. 
A. Price Effect -- negative 
Differentiating k in (24)' with respect to n, and rearranging, we obtain 
(38) dAR = - _!A~1 [m(l + t)'P'-1 dP + ((1 + t)'P ' - (1 +t)')] . 
dn r dn 
Since r is negative, the term outside of the square bracket [ ] of the RHS is positive, 
and, therefore, the sign of the derivative depends only on the sign of [ ]. Since it is 
easy to check that both of the terms in the bracket [ ] are negative, the combined price 
effect is also negative. These two subeffects can be interpreted as follows: 
(i) Price hike of FfA good -- negative (the first term). 
As already shown, the relative price of an FfA good (P) increases as n increases. 
Therefore, when n increases due to the creation or expansion of an outside FfA, the 
third country has to pay more for each unit of imports from the FfA, which would 
contribute to the decline in their welfare. 
(ii) Price hike of switching-country good -- negative (the second term) 
When the FfA expands, some of the countries in the ROW are included in the 
FfA as its new members. For the consumers in the still-left-out countries, the price of 
the goods imported from the switching country increases from (1 +t) to P(l +t). Such a 
pnce increase would contribute to the decline in the welfare of the outside country. 
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B. Income Effect -- Negative 
The income effect (i.e., the change in YR induced by the increase in n) can also be 
decomposed into several subeffects. Differentiating YR in (25) with respect to n, we 
obtain (39) 
(39) dYR 
dn dP dC dC 
= t (PCFR- CfR) +t n ( CFR-+ p____!!i )+ t (N-n- l)-1B..
dn dn dn 
Note that, since the producer price of the ROW good is set to unity, the value of the 
output in the representative country in the ROW is still one, and, therefore, all of the 
income effect is coming from the change in tariff revenue. 
(i) Decline in tariff revenue from switching-country good -- negative (the first term) 
When some countries join the FTA, the value of the imports from such a country 
decreases (Note that we can show PCFR < CfR .) Therefore, the tariff revenue from such 
imports also declines. The decline in the tariff revenue from the imports of the 
switching-country goods contributes to the decline in welfare. 
(ii) Change in tariff revenue from the FTA good -- ambiguous (the second terms) 
Since we already know that dP/dn>O, the first term in parenthesis is positive. If 
the quantity of imports from an old FfA country were the same, the tariff revenue from 
FfA would increase. But, when the FTA expands, the quantity of goods imported from 
an FfA country (CFR) may increase or decrease depending on the values of parameters 
in the model (/3, t, N, and n). Thus, the welfare impact resulting from the change in 
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tariff revenue from FfA good is ambiguous, although, according to simulation, this effect 
is negative in most cases. 
(iii) Increase in tariff revenue from the ROW good -- positive (the third term) 
Since we can show that CfR increases as n increases, the third term is a positive 
subeffect. When the FfA expands, imports to the representative ROW country from 
other ROW countries increase, and therefore, the tariff revenue from such an import 
increases. This would contribute to the increase in the welfare of the representative 
ROW country. 
(iv) Overall income effect -- negative 
Although the income effect for the ROW can be decomposed into the three 
conflicting subeffects above, the overall income effect, which combines the three 
subeffects, turns out to be negative. This can be shown as follows: by repeated 
substitution of equilibrium conditions and rearrangement, we obtain 
1(40) YR=------, 




where A = nPr + (N- n-1) 
Differentiating A with respect to n, we obtain 
(41) 
The inequality holds because r <0, 1<P, and dP/dn>O. From equation ( 40) YR is a 
monotonically increasing function ofA. Therefore, we know that YR decreases as n 
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mcreases. Thus, it is proved that the overall income effect is also negative. 
dYR
(42) -- < 0 
dn 
The above analysis can be summarized into the following proposition. 
(Proposition 5) The impact of regi,onal integration on the welfare of the third country can 
be decomposed into the following subeffects. 
A. Price Effect (negative) 
(i) Price hike ofFTA good (negative) 
(ii) Price hike of switching-country good (negative) 
B. Income Effect (negative) 
(i) Decline in tariff revenue from switching-country good (negative) 
(ii) Change in tariff revenue from FTA good (ambiguous) 
(iii) Increase in tariff revenue from ROW good (positive) 
Since, in the outside country, both the price effects and income effects are 
negative, the overall welfare effect is also negative 
dVR 
(43) -- < 0 
dn 
Thus, the following important proposition is proved. 
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(Proposition 6) Even if external tariffs of the FTA remain the same, as Article XXIV of the 
GATT requites, the welfare of the third country which -is left out of the FTA unambiguously 
declines. 
Proposition 6 suggests that Article XXIV of the GAIT is not a sufficient 
safeguard against the welfare loss of the third countries. Note that the above proposition 
is analytically proved, and therefore, it does not depend on the parameter values of the 
model. 
4. The Effect on the Welfare of Existing FfA Members 
What then is the impact of an expansion of the FfA on the welfare of the existing 
FfA member countries? Although the welfare of the newly switched member certainly 
improves, the impact on the welfare of the old FfA member is not straightfmward 
because various conflicting subeffects are working. In fact, the impact of the expansion 
of the FfA on the welfare of the old members is ambiguous and depends on the 
parameters of the model. However, in most reasonable cases, as the FfA expands, the 
welfare of the existing FfA member improves at first, but when the size of the FfA 
becomes large, their welfare begins to decrease. In other words, when the FfA becomes 
very large, an incentive emerges among old members to reject the admission of new 
members. 
As shown in equation (20), the welfare of the representative existing member of 
the FfA can be expressed by the indirect utility function 
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Equation (20)' implies that the change in the utility (VF) can be decomposed into the 
price effect (i.e., the change in h) and the income effect (the change in YF), as is the 
case for ROW welfare. 
A. Price Effect 
While in the case of the ROW's welfare the price effect was unambiguously 
negative, it is more complicated here. Differentiating h with respect to n, and 
rearranging, we obtain 
(44) 
Since r is negative, the term outside of the square bracket [ ] of the RHS is positive, 
and, therefore, the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of [ ]. Although the first 
term in the bracket [ ] is negative, the second one is positive, and, therefore, the 
combined price effect is ambiguous. However, a closer look at equation ( 44) gives us 
some insights into the mechanism of the welfare impact of the expansion of the FI'A. 
The two terms in the bracket can be interpreted as follows: 
(i) Price hike of FfA good -- negative (the first term) 
Since we already know dP/dn>0 and r < 0, the first term in [ ] of equation (44) 
is negative. In other words, when the FfA expands, consumers in the FfA have to pay 
more for each unit of FfA goods, which would contribute to the decline of their welfare. 
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The old members of the FrA, as well as the ROW countries, suffer from this negative 
welfare effect resulting from the more expensive FrA goods after the expansion of the 
FTA. 
(ii) Price reduction of switching-country good -- positive (the second term) 
Since r is negative and P is smaller than (1 +t), the second term in [ ] is positive. 
When the FfA expands, some of the countries in the ROW are brought into the FrA as 
its new members. For the consumers in the FfA, the price of the goods imported from 
those switching countries deceases from (1 +t) to P. Such price reductions would 
contribute to the increase of their welfare. 
B. Income Effect 
The income effect (i.e., the change in YF induced by the increase in n) can also be 
decomposed into a few subeffects. Differentiating YF in (21) with respect to n, we obtain 
(45) dYF = dP - t C + t (N- n) dCRF 
dn dn RF dn 
Note that since the producer price of the FrA (P) good changes, the income effect 
consists of the change in the market value of the output and the change in tariff revenues. 
In equation ( 45), the second term and the third terms of the RHS show the income 
effect resulting from the change in tariff revenues. The three terms in the RHS of 
equation ( 45) can be interpreted as follows. 
(i) Increased value of own output -- positive (the first term) 
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The first term of the RHS is clearly positive. When P is increased by the 
expansion of the FTA, the market values of the domestic output in the representative 
country in the FTA increases, which make it richer than before. The increase in the 
market value of their own output would contribute to the improvement in the welfare of 
the old FfA members. 
(ii) Loss of tariff revenue from switching-country good -- negative (the second term) 
The second term of the RHS is clearly negative. Note that tCRF is the tariff 
revenue from the import from a ROW country. When one of the previous ROW 
countries is admitted as a new member of the FfA, the tariff revenue from that country 
becomes zero although it used to be tCRF before the admission. In other words, even 
when the quantity CRF does not change, the tariff revenue decreases because the number 
of ROW countries on which the tariff is imposed by the FTA members declines. Such a 
decline in tariff revenues would contribute to the decrease in the welfare of the existing 
FTA members. 
(iii) Change in tariff revenue from the ROW good -- ambiguous (the third term) 
When the FfA expands, the quantity of imports from each ROW country, and 
the tariff revenue arising from the imports, would change. CRF may increase or decrease, 
depending on the values of parameters in the model. Such quantity change affects the 
tariff revenue, and thereby the welfare, of the old members in the FfA. 
The above analysis can be summarized into the following proposition. 
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(Proposition 7) The impact of regi,onal integration on the welfare of the old FTA member 
can be decomposed into the fallowing subeffects, although the overall effect is ambiguous. 
A. Price Effect 
(i) Price hike of the FTA good (negative) 
(ii) Price reduction of switching-country good (positive) 
B. Income Effect 
(i) Increased value of own output (positive) 
(ii) Loss of tariff revenue from switching-country good (negative) 
(iii) Change in tariff revenue from the ROW good (ambiguous) 
C. Overall Welfare Effect -- A Simulation 
Although we proved analytically that third countries are worse off when the 
outside FfA expands, even if Article XXIV of the GATI is strictly enforced, it is 
ambiguous whether existing members of the FfA are worse off or better off because a 
few conflicting factors affect the welfare level of the existing members. 
In order to determine the most likely effect on the existing members' welfare of 
the expansion of an FfA, we conducted a simulation using the above model. The results 
are summarized in Figure 1. Each panel of Figure 1 shows the simulation result using 
certain values for /3 and t. The welfare of the existing member is plotted on the vertical 
axis while the number of countries in the FfA (n) is plotted on the horizontal axis. On 
the horizontal axis, n is plotted from one to N-l. We found that except for Case 2, 
where the values of both /3 and t are unbelievably high (in this case, the elasticity of 
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substitution among differentiated products is ten, and the tariff rate is as high as a 
hundred percent), the patterns of the overall welfare effect are surprisingly similar to 
each other: Welfare first increases with the expansion of an FTA, but when about half of 
the world is united into the FTA, welfare begi,ns to decrease with the further expansion of the 
FTA. 
The implication of this simulation for the real world would be as follows. When 
some countries form an FTA, their welfare improves at first (at the expense of the third 
countries), and therefore, they are motivated to expand the FTA. This may explain why 
North American or European countries are eager to be united into an FTA (e.g., 
NAFTA) or to strengthen the existing form of integration (e.g., EC92 and beyond). 
However, when the size of the FTA reaches a certain point (i.e., about a half of the 
world economy), further expansion is welfare-worsening for the old FfA members. This 
constitutes a disincentive for admitting new members6• Hence, it is possible for the 
enlarged EU or NAFTA members to be reluctant to admit small Asian countries. 
Furthermore, it can be shown, using a similar model, that when 
counterintegration among ROW countries occurs, the welfare of the members of the 
original FTA declines (See Goto-Hamada (1994) for a detailed discussion of this point). 
This may explain why the United States was so strongly against the initiative toward 
integration in Asia from which it was excluded, for example, the EAEC. 
6ln view of this finding, it is interesting to note that the combined share of the EU 
and the NAFTA in the world economy is 58 percent, as discussed in Section IV below. 
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IV. Regionalism and Asian Countries -- Simulation 
1. An Oveiview 
The world is now under the influence of a new regionalism. After the progress 
toward the EU and the NAFTA, various movements toward economic integration in 
Asia have been observed. Some of the attempts are to form an exclusive regional FTA, 
as exemplified by the plan of the EAEC proposed by Premier Mahathir of Malaysia, 
while others are to form a more open regional agreement such as the APEC, which has 
been endorsed by the United States. In order to assess the economic incentives and 
political economy underlying these moves, we conducted simulation exercises using the 
model developed above. However, the simulation model in this section is more 
sophisticated than the analytical model in the previous section in that the model here is 
able to capture the reality that there are multiple FTAs in the world (e.g., EU, NAFfA, 
AFTA, etc.) In the model of Section III, n countries are assumed to form the FTA, 
and the rest of the world (N-n countries) is assumed to be totally fragmented. However, 
the simulation model in this section allows plural FTAs, where, for example, n1 countries 
form the European Union, n2 countries the NAFTA, n3 countries the AFTA, and so 
forth. 
Using the plural FTA model, we calibrated the welfare level of each player 
( country) for various configurations of the regional integration in the world. As 
discussed in detail below, our simulation results suggest that Asian developing countries 
incur substantial welfare loss after the two major blocs (EU and NAFTA) are formed. 
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However, if they are united into, say, the "EAEC,"7 or the APEC, their welfare improves 
dramatically. Such a pattern of welfare change would help explain why small Asian 
countries are eager to be united into a free trade area. Further, our simulation results 
suggest that the welfare level of the United States is increased somewhat by the 
formation of the NAFTA, but if Asia is united into a countervailing exclusive FfA such 
as the "EAEC", the U.S. welfare level is reduced to a level lower than that of the pre­
NAFTA level. This might explain why the United States has adamantly opposed the 
"EAEC" which excludes it and why it enthusiastically endorses the APEC free trade area 
which includes it. The APEC may be a politically feasible configuration in the world 
because it substantially increases the welfare level of major participants. 
Moreover, the worldwide FfA does not seem to be the best regime, at least for 
the major countries in the world, e.g., the United States. In fact, the welfare level of the 
large country ( or countries in the large bloc) is higher in the various configurations of 
the FfA than it would be in worldwide free trade. This would suggest that the major 
countries may well be reluctant to move toward complete world free trade. 
7Since the actual EAEC has a controversial nature, we use the quote-and-quote 
"EAEC" as an example of Asian economic integration. Our "EAEC" does not have other 
non-economic connotations except for the fact that it is a name for an Asian economic 
umon. 
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2. Method of Simulation 
A. Differences in Country Size 
As seen in Section III, our model assumes that the world consists of many 
identical 'provinces'. Differences in the size of the 'country' can be incorporated by 
simply assuming that the larger country has more provinces in it than the smaller 
country. For example, the United States is considered to consist of a larger number of 
provinces than a smaller country, say, Jamaica, and therefore, the former produces a 
greater variety of differentiated products while the latter produces only a limited number 
of types of differentiated products (coffee?). 
Table 1 summarizes the method we used to incorporate country-size differences 
into the simulation model. As shown in the table, the U.S. GDP is more than a hundred 
times larger than that of the average developing country. By normalizing the GDP of 
the average developing country (forty billion U.S. dollars), the world is considered to 
consist of 560 provinces, i.e., the total world GDP is 560 times higher than the GDP of 
an average LDC. Therefore, as seen in the table, the United States and Japan, for 
example, consist of 137 provinces and 74 provinces, respectively, among which free trade 
prevails, while an average LDC consists of one province. 
When we compiled Table 1, we omitted countries whose GDP was less than one 
billion dollars in order to prevent the size of an average LDC from becoming too small. 
The number of countries in the world, therefore, was reduced from the actual listing in 
the UNCTAD (164 countries) to 137. We assume that the size of each LDC is 
represented by the average of all LDCs, and that the size of each EU member is also 
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represented by the average of all EU members8• The memo item at the bottom of the 
table shows selected countries whose GDP is similar to the LDC average (forty billion 
dollars). These countries include Colombia, Egypt, Nigeria, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Pakistan, and Myanmar, among others. Thus, the size of an average LDC in 
the model is not so much different from what we think of as an average developing 
country. 
B. Identification of t and B 
After having identified the number of provinces in the model (i.e., N =560), we 
needed to identify the values oft (tariff plus tariff equivalency of nontariff barriers) and 
/3 in the utility function. We borrowed the values of these parameters from previously 
existing estimates. The World Bank (1995) gives, as its data for trade-weighted average 
tariff rates, 6.2 percent for developed countries and 15 percent for developing countries. 
By weighting these figures by value of trade for DCs and LDCs, we obtained an average 
world tariff rate of 9.1 percent. For the tariff equivalency of nontariff barriers (NTBs), 
we used the estimates of Laird and Yeats (1990) and Low and Yeats (1995). Adjusted 
for the coverage of the NTBs, we obtained an average world tariff equivalency of the 
NTBs of 7.12 percent. Therefore, tis calculated as 0.17; in other words, due to the 
tariffs and NTBs, the consumer price of imported goods is 17 percent higher on average 
8Of course, the alternative specification is conceptually possible where the size of 
each of 137 countries is different according to its actual GDP size. However, if we tried 
to incorporate the size difference of all 137 countries, we would have (137x137= 18,769) 
elements for each set like C and P. The simulation model that incorporates so many 
elements would be too large to be solved by the computer software at hand. 
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than the producer price in the exporting country. 
The value for /3 in the utility function is not so straightfmward. But note that 
since the elasticity of substitution between the differentiated products is equal to 
1 / (1 - /3), the value of /3 can be calculated from the estimated value of the elasticity of 
substitution among the products made in different countries. Richardson (1972), quoted 
by Stern and Schumacher (1976), reported that the elasticity of substitution between U.S. 
goods and German goods was estimated to be 2.52; .from this we obtained /3 = 0.603. 
C. Seven Cases for Simulation Exercise 
Now that we have all the necessary parameter values, i.e., N=560, t=0.17, and 
{3=0.6, we can calibrate the welfare level of each player for various FfA configurations 
which are characterized by the values of n1, n2, ••••••• We report here the calibration 
results for seven different configurations as shown in Figure 2.9 
CASE 1 (Totally Fragmented World) : This is an imaginary configuration where the world 
is totally fragmented into 560 independent provinces. Needless to say, such a 
fragmented configuration has never existed, and some countries, like the United States, 
are very large even before any FfA formation. So, the simulation result in Case 1 is 
reported only to give an idea how much the larger countries are benefitted by their size 
even before any regional integration. 
Of course, the above identification of t and /3 is not decisive. Therefore, we 
conducted the sensitivity analysis using various values fort (O.l, 0.17, and 0.3) and /3 (0.5, 
0.6, and 0.7). The results of this analysis are available on request. The results of these 
simulations are very insensitive to the parameter values. Hence, the results reported 
here are robust and hold for a wide range of parameter values. 
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CASE 2 (Before EU) : Here, we introduce the difference in the size of each country. In 
this case (before EU) the European countries are considered to be separated from each 
other. Hence, the world is characterized by five different players, i.e., an average 
European country, Canada, the United States, Japan, and an average LDC. As shown in 
Figure 2, even in this case without any FTA, the shares of the U.S. and Japan in the 
world economy are very large at, respectively, 24.5 percent and 13.2 percent. 
CASE 3 (EU Only) : In this case fifteen European countries are united into the 
European Union, whose share in the world economy is almost 30 percent, which is larger 
than that of the United States (24.5 percent). Further, the EU is the only FTA in the 
world. 
CASE 4 (EU and NAFTA) : In this case the United States, Canada, and Mexico are 
united into the NAFTA, whose share in the world economy is 28 percent. As a result, 
there are two big trading blocs in the world, the EU and NAFTA, which comprise about 
60 percent of the world economy. Note that the United States is much larger than the 
other two NAFTA members. Hence, as discussed in detail below, the benefit from 
forming the NAFTA seems to be larger for the two smaller partners than for the United 
States. 
CASE 5 (EU, NAFTA, and "EAEC') : As discussed above, faced with the two big 
trading blocs of the EU and NAFTA, the "EAEC" was proposed by Asian countries as a 
way to form their own countervailing trading bloc. Case 5 captures the situation in 
which such a countervailing bloc is realized and all Asian countries, including Japan, are 
joined in the hypothetical "EAEC". When all Asian countries (excluding West Asia and 
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Oceania) are united, its world share becomes 20.4 percent. In other words, in this case 
there are three major trading blocs of similar size in the world. 
CASE 6 (EU and APEC) : The initiative of the United States, in recent years, has 
produced remarkable progress toward the APEC free trade area. As indicated in the 
communique of the APEC Summit Meeting held in Indonesia in 1994, the advanced 
countries and developing countries in the APEC agreed to realize free trade by the years 
2010 and 2020, respectively. Case 6 illustrates such a situation, and the share of the 
APEC countries would be almost half of the world economy. 
CASE 7 (World Free Trade) : This is the situation in which all countries in the world 
abolish all tariffs and NTBs, and thereby free international movement of goods is 
realized. This is probably also a fairly imaginary case as was true for Case 1. 
3. Results of Simulation 
Using the model and parameter values discussed above, we conducted simulations 
for the seven cases. The results of the simulation are summarized in Figure 3, which is 
fairly self-explanatory. In the figure, the level of welfare of each of the six types of 
players, i.e., an average European country, Canada, U.S.A., Japan, an average Asian 
LDC, and an average country in the rest of the world, are plotted on the vertical axis for 
the seven configurations. 
First, look at the welfare of each player in Case 2, where no FTA exists in the 
world. Note that, even without any FTA agreement, the consumers in the larger 
economies like the U.S. and Japan are better off than those in the smaller LDCs. 
33 
Second, when European countries are united into a single FfA, the EU, their 
welfare improves very much while other players incur a substantial loss (see Case 3). 
Such welfare loss outside of the EU would prompt the formation of other countervailing 
FfAs like NAFfA. 
Third, when NAFfA is formed (Case 4), the welfare of the NAFfA members 
improves while that of the non-NAFfA countries worsens. The welfare impact of the 
NAFfA is much stronger on the smaller members, i.e., Canada and Mexico, than on the 
United States. The welfare of Mexico increases from the level of the ROW in Case 3 to 
the level of United States in Case 4. This asymmetric impact is due to the fact that, 
when the NAFfA is formed, the market for the producers in Canada and Mexico 
dramatically expands because now they have free access to the huge U.S. market, while 
for the U.S. producers the size of expanded markets in Canada and Mexico is smaller 
relative to the home market. 
Fourth, when Asian LDCs and Japan are united into the single FfA that is 
hypothetically called 11EAEC'1 (Case 5), the world is characterized by three trading blocs 
of similar size. The welfare of an Asian LDC improves substantially while the favorable 
effect for Japan is relatively small because the smaller Asian countries now have free 
access to the huge Japanese market. Note that the welfare level of the United States 
under this countervailing FfA in Asia is below that of the pre-NAFfA configuration. 
This would explain, to some extent, the anti-"EAEC" sentiment of the United States. 
Fifth, when all of the APEC countries in Asia, Pacific, and America are united 
into the single FfA, its impact on the Asian LDCs is dramatic. In addition, the impact 
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on larger members like the United States and Japan is also remarkable. Thus, the 
formation of the APEC is very much welfare-improving for all major participants, e.g., 
the U.S., Japan, and the Asian LDCs. In other words, the formation of the APEC free 
· trade area seems politically feasible because it substantially increases the welfare of all 
major members. However, it is important to note that the welfare of the rest of the 
world, e.g., African countries, consistently declines as the world becomes more integrated 
from Case 2 through Case 6. 
Sixth, when there is completely free world trade (Case 7), the welfare levels of the 
member countries of the major FfAs substantially decline although the welfare of the 
rest of the world, which had previously been left out of any FfA, is dramatically 
improved by the worldwide free trade. The decline of the welfare of the major countries 
suggests that the realization of the world free trade is difficult. In fact, the welfare level 
of the largest economy in the world, the United States, in Case 7 is the lowest among 
her welfare levels in various FfA configurations. Moreover, the welfare level of the 
second largest economy, Japan, in Case 7 is lower than her welfare in Case 2 (without 
any FfA in the world). Namely, major countries in the world may be motivated to 
oppose worldwide free trade because they would be worse off under this senario than 
under various configurations of the trading blocs. 
Finally, in order to evaluate the welfare change of the world as a whole for 
various FfA configurations, we calculated the level of world welfare as the weighted 
average of the welfare levels of all countries. The results are shown in Figure 4. 
Although the major countries like the United States and Japan are benefited from 
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various configuration of regional integration, the welfare of the world as a whole 
consistently declines as the FTA configuration moves from Case 2 through Case 6. This 
suggests that if some kind of side payments are feasible, world free trade may be realized 
in spite of the discussion above. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
By using a simple trade model of product differentiation, we have analyzed the 
impact of various configurations of regional economic integration on outside countries as 
well as member countries under the realistic assumptions of constant external tariffs and 
asymmetric formation of the FTA. In spite of some rigidities in the model, for example 
the invariance of the production side to tariffs, this model facilitates our understanding 
of the effect of the regional blocs because the welfare impact is decomposed into several 
subeffects, each of which has distinct economic implications. 
In addition, it has been shown that economic integration may benefit the 
participating countries but definitely worsens the welfare of the rest of the world even if the 
external tariffs of the FTA remain constant as Article XXIV of the GAIT requires. This 
suggests that the present provision of the GAIT (and WTO) is not sufficient. Article 
XXIV may well be strengthened in order to avoid the situation in which the formation of 
one regional bloc leads to another bloc, and consequently results in a world economy 
that is a collection of blocs each with strong protectionism. 
According to the simulation to calibrate the model to reflect the regional 
integration in the real world, we find it natural for smaller Asian countries to have tried 
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to form a counter bloc, faced with the formation of two big blocs outside, i.e., EU and 
NAFTA. We also find it natural for the United States to oppose the formation of a bloc 
that would exclude it and to propose instead a wider union like the APEC that would 
include it. Further, since the APEC is expected to increase substantially the welfare 
levels of smaller Asian countries as well as those of large members like the United States 
and Japan, the APEC can be regarded as a feasible configuration of future regional 
integration. · Further, our simulation result suggests a pessimistic conclusion that world­
wide free trade may not be easily achieved because when completely free world trade is 
realized, the welfare levels of the major players decline from those achieved under 
various configurations of FfAs. 
In spite of the addition of various new realities to the model, we are aware that 
our analysis still depends on many simplifying assumptions, and, therefore, further 
studies are needed to understand the impact of regional integration more precisely. 
First, as was done by Krugman, Gros, and Frankel, Stein, and Wei, we have neglected 
the effect of increasing returns to scale though varying elasticities of demand. 
Presumably, this effect is strong if the number of countries or provinces is small. While 
the major conclusion of our paper seems to be intact due to the existence of the large 
number of countries in the world, further studies are needed. By incorporating the real 
thrust of increasing returns, we would be able to evaluate the impact of regional 
integration more comprehensively.10 Second, the effect of location, distance or could be 
10 However, our preliminary simulation which includes the real thrust of increasing 
returns suggests that the impact of the inclusion is relatively small. 
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incorporated into our asymmetric model. By doing so, we may be able to understand 
why regional blocs are formed among countries with geographical proximity and cultural 
similarity. Third, it would be important also to analyze the effect of regional integration 
in a traditional· model like Heckcsher-Ohlin model, to take account of the differences in 
factor endowment as pointed out by Srinivasan (1993). 
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TABLE 1 
SIZE OF COUNTRIES (GDP WEIGHT) 
(1990) 
AVERAGE 
GDP NUMBER OF GDP NUMBER OF SHARE 
($BILLION) COUNTRIES ($BILLION) PROVINCES (%) 
EU 15 6,547 15 436 165 29.5 
CANADA 567 1 567 14 2.5 
USA 5,465 1 5,465 137 24.5 
JAPAN 2,940 1 2,940 74 13.2 
ASIA LDC 1,591 31 51 40 7.1 
OTHER 5,230 88 59 131 23.4 
WORLD 22,340 137 163 560 100.0 
LDC 4,272 107 40 107 19.1 
(MEMO ITEM) 
COUNTRIES OF SIMILAR 











GDP: UNCTAD (1992), Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics. 
Number of Provinces: Author's calculation, see main text for details. 
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FIGURE 1 
EXPANSION OF FfA AND WELFARE OF OLD MEMBERS 
Case 1 (medium {3 and medium t) Case 2 (high {3 and hight) 
Case 3 (high {3 and low t) Case 4 (low {3 and high t) 
Case 5 (low {3 and low t) 
Note: {3: high: 0.9 medium: 0.6 low: 0.3 
t: high: 100% medium: 20% low: 1% 
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FIGURE 2 
VARIOUS FTA CONFIGURATIONS 
(CASE 1) Totally Fragmented 
Totally Fragmented 






(CASE 5) EU, NAFTA, EAEC 
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(CASE 7) World Free Trade 
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(NOTE) 
CASE 1 : Totally Fragmented World (Hypothetical) 
CASE 2: Before EU with Actual Country Size 
CASE 3 : EU Only 
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CASE 6 : EU and APEC 
CASE 7 : World Free Trade 
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FIGURE 4 
CHANGE IN WORLD WELFARE 
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